Negligent Rescue Resulting in Death Is Not Actionable Under Section 1983: Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1325 (1984) by Bourgeacq, Christian A.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 63 Issue 2 
January 1985 
Negligent Rescue Resulting in Death Is Not Actionable Under 
Section 1983: Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, cert. 
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1325 (1984) 
Christian A. Bourgeacq 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the 
Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christian A. Bourgeacq, Negligent Rescue Resulting in Death Is Not Actionable Under Section 1983: 
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1325 (1984), 63 WASH. U. L. Q. 285 (1985). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss2/4 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
CASE COMMENTS
NEGLIGENT RESCUE RESULTING IN DEATH IS NOT ACTIONABLE
UNDER SECTION 1983
Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 1325 (1984)
In Jackson v. City ofJoliet,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit narrowed the reach of federal civil rights law by holding
that a negligent deprivation of life is not actionable under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.2
Sandra Jackson and Jerry Ross were driving on a road when their car
inexplicably swerved off the road, crashed and caught fire.3 A Joliet po-
liceman arrived at the scene a few minutes later but failed to check the
car for passengers or to call an ambulance.4 He called the fire depart-
ment, however, and directed traffic away from the accident scene.5 After
extinguishing the fire, the firemen discovered Jackson and Ross in the
car.6 They also failed to assist Jackson and Ross, calling an ambulance
instead.7 The paramedics left Ross for dead and took Jackson to a hospi-
tal, where she died shortly thereafter.'
The decedents' representatives brought suit under section 1983 against
the city and several individuals.9 The plaintiffs alleged that the conduct
of various officials deprived the decedents of life without due process of
law under the fourteenth amendment.10 The defendants appealed the
1. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1325 (1984).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1982); also
known as the "Ku Klux Klan Act").
3. 715 F.2d at 1201.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1202.
7. Id. The coroner issued a local directive which forebade firemen from touching corpses until
someone from the coroner's office arrived. Id. Presumably the firemen thought Jackson and Ross
were dead.
8. Id. At the time of her death, Jackson was six months pregnant. Id. at 1201. The elapsed
time between the arrival of the policeman and the ambulance was about one hour. Id. at 1201-02.
Ross was later pronounced dead by the coroner. Id.
9. Id. Specifically named as individual defendants were the policemen and firemen present at
the scene of the accident, the coroner who issued the directive, see supra note 7, and the police and
fire chiefs. Id.
10. Id. Section 1983 expressly authorizes suits against state officials for deprivations of consti-
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trial court's denial of their motion to dismiss." On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit reversed, dismissed the suit and held: A negligent' 2 or grossly
negligent'3 rescue attempt by state officials resulting in the death of acci-
dent victims is not a deprivation of life without due process of law.'4
Congress enacted the language of section 1983 in 1871 to curb official
tolerance of, as well as participation in, racial violence in the South. 5
Section 1983 provided a federal remedy to individuals deprived of their
constitutional rights by persons acting "under color of" state law.' 6 For
nearly a century, the courts curtailed section 1983's potentially broad
reach by narrowly defining official misconduct 17 and by requiring a
showing of intentional misconduct.'"
tutional rights. The fourteenth amendment provides in part that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. 715 F.2d at 1201.
12. Negligence refers to conduct that falls below the standard of care established by society to
protect others against unreasonable risk of harm. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
169 (5th ed. 1984).
13. Gross negligence defies easy definition, but generally refers to an extreme departure from
ordinary care. Some courts define gross negligence to require some element of willful misconduct,
while others define gross negligence as more than negligence but less than a conscious indifference to
known risks. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, at 211-12.
One district court, addressing § 1983, gave the following definition of gross negligence: "an ex-
treme departure from the ordinary standard of care... near recklessness or shockingly unjustified
and unreasonable action." Smith v. Hill, 510 F. Supp. 767, 775 (D. Utah 1981).
Smith illustrates the small degree by which some jurisdictions might distinguish gross negligence
from negligent or intentional conduct. In the future, this narrow distinction might mean the differ-
ence between state or federal jurisdiction. See infra notes 31-40 and accompanying text (discussing
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 545 (1981), and its implications).
This Comment associates gross negligence with conscious indifference. Although the court's hold-
ing refers to gross negligence, this reference is dicta, leaving Jackson applicable only to negligence
actions. 715 F.2d at 1202 & 1206. See infra note 50.
14. 715 F.2d at 1206.
15. For a discussion of the political background that accompanied § 1983's enactment, see 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES-CIVIL RIGHTS 591-653 (1970); SEC-
TION 1983: SWORD AND SHIELD 23-28 (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle ed. 1983); Note, Actionability of
Negligence under Section 1983 and the Eighth Amendment, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 536-44 (1978);
and Case Comment, Civil Rights-42 U.S.C § 1983 Due Process Requirements for Negligent Prop-
erty Deprivations, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 1491, 1492 (1982).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See infra note 20 (discussing "under color of' state law).
17. Between 1871 and 1936, only 19 reported decisions rested on § 1983. Note, Limiting the
Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486, 1486 n.4 (1969). In
1960, about 300 civil rights suits were filed in federal courts. See Note, Due Process and Section
1983: Limiting Parratt v. Taylor to Negligent Conduct, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 253, 258-59 n.22 (1983);
see also Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Failure to Act as "Custom or Policy," 28
WAYNE L. REV. 1225, 1227 (1983) (discussing the narrow construction of official misconduct).
18. See, eg., Agnew v. City of Compton, 239 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir. 1956) (defendant must act
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In Monroe v. Pape,19 a 1961 decision, the Supreme Court ended nearly
a century of restraint by expanding the meaning of conduct "under color
of" state law26 and rejecting the notion that a section 1983 violation re-
quires intentional misconduct.21 Justice Douglas, writing for the major-
ity, suggested that section 1983 contemplated no specific state of mind.22
Nevertheless, courts and commentators continue to fashion state-of-mind
requirements for section 1983, despite Monroe's indication that no such
requirements apply.
23
"with a purpose to deprive" a person of his rights); Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705, 707 (10th Cir.
1948) (same). But see Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 1945) (arguing that
§ 1983 makes no reference to defendant's state of mind).
19. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, thirteen policemen broke into the plaintiffs' home without
a warrant, routed them from bed, and made them stand naked during a search of the house. Id. at
169. After the search, the police took Mr. Monroe to the station, where they questioned him for ten
hours without allowing him to call his family or an attorney. Id. The police later released Monroe
without charging him. Id. at 169.
20. The definition includes anyone vested with state authority who acts in accordance with or
beyond his official capacity. Id. at 172-87. Justice Douglas rejected the argument that because the
police transcended their authority by acting without warrants, the misconduct could not be "under
color of" state law. Id. at 172. According to Justice Douglas, § 1983 applies "against those who
carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accord-
ance with their authority or misuse it." Id.
21. Id. at 187. Additionally, the Monroe Court rejected exhaustion of state remedies as a pre-
condition for access to the federal courts and granted cities immunity from § 1983 liability. Id.
Justice Douglas contended that § 1983's federal remedy supplemented any state remedies. Id. at
183. Since Monroe, all circuits have followed the "no exhaustion" rule with respect to state judicial
remedies. See NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION § 103 (1979). One exception,
however, is prisoner-confinement challenges. Id. Another exception exists when the plaintiff has
state criminal proceedings pending against him. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see also
NAHMOD, supra at 148-57 (explaining the Younger rule).
The city of Chicago, also a defendant in Monroe, argued that, as a municipality, it was not liable
for the policemen's actions. 365 U.S. at 187. The Court agreed, stating that Congress did not intend
to "bring municipal corporations within the ambit of [§ 1983]." Id. The Court construed the word
"person" in § 1983 to exclude cities and counties. Id. at 188-92. Seventeen years later, however, the
Court rejected the municipal immunity created in Monroe. Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
22. 365 U.S. at 187. Justice Douglas relied on the language of the statute, which contains no
reference to a particular state of mind. Notably, the legislative history is silent on the appropriate
state of mind in § 1983 actions. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 15 (documenting § 1983's
legislative history). Justice Douglas also refused to analogize § 1983 to its criminal counterpart, 18
U.S.C. § 242 (1982), which requires the defendant to act "willfully." He concluded that § 1983
"should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions." 365 U.S. at 187. Considerable debate exists on whether this language
eliminates any state-of-mind requirement for § 1983 liability.
23. Much of the confusion surrounding § 1983's mental state analysis is attributable to the
ambiguity of Justice Douglas' language in Monroe. See supra note 22.
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Intentional misconduct 24 clearly is actionable under section 1983.25
The typical cause of action since Monroe involves a deliberate depriva-
tion of life or liberty.26 With few exceptions, less than intentional con-
duct may also fall within the statute.27 It appears well settled that gross
negligence, either by a defendant's action2" or inaction,29 satisfies section
24. Conduct is intentional when the actor desires the consequences or is substantially certain
that the consequences will occur. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 12, at 34.
25. See, eg., Glover v. Alabama Dep't of Corrections, 734 F.2d 691 (11th Cir. 1984) (assault);
Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442 (5th Cir. 1984) (false imprisonment); Tydings v. Dep't of Correc-
tions, 714 F.2d 11 (4th Cir. 1983) (conversion), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3587 (1984); Mosher v.
Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1978) (trespass). But see infra note 26 (discussing Hudson v.
Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984)).
26. Justice Powell recently contended that a "deprivation" under § 1983 "connotes an inten-
tional act." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). He later added that
a deliberate omission also constitutes a "deprivation" under § 1983. 451 U.S. at 548. An intentional
injury committed "under color of" state law, however, does not automatically trigger § 1983. The
victim must suffer an injury to a constitutionally protected right. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976), rehg denied, 425 U.S. 985 (1976). In Paul, the Court concluded that the state's defamation,
though injurious to the plaintiff, failed to rise to the level of a constitutional tort or to implicate any
"liberty" or "property" interest. See also Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort Under Section
1983: The State-of-Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 45, 55 n.52 (collecting cases representing
other interests outside the fourteenth amendment's protection). For a discussion of the constitu-
tional and statutory rights embraced by § 1983, see NAHMOD, supra note 21, cl. 2.
In Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984), however, the Court held that intentional depriva-
tions of property were not actionable under § 1983 when the defendant could show the existence of
an adequate state remedy consistent with the holding in Parratt. Hudson probably has carved out a
huge exception to § 1983, leaving only liberty interests within the statute's reach. See infra note 82.
27. Equal protection claims under § 1983 require intentional conduct. See Washington v. Da-
vis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Similarly, there must be an intentional interception and use of attorney-
client information to maintain a sixth amendment claim under § 1983. See Weatherford v. Bursey,
429 U.S. 545 (1977).
28. See, eg., Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1970). In Jenkins, the plaintiff was
shot by a policeman who claimed his gun was fired accidentally. Id. at 1231-32. The Fourth Circuit
held that gross negligence could support a § 1983 action because once a plaintiff establishes a depri-
vation of a constitutionally protected interest, no further showing of intent is necessary. Id. at 1232.
Jenkins still retains its vitality. See, eg., Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 796 n.3 (4th Cir. 1983)
(citing Jenkins); Ladnier v. Murray, 572 F. Supp. 544, 548 (D. Md. 1983) (same).
29. See, eg., Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4, 9 (Ist Cir. 1983) (liability under § 1983 may be
imposed for failure to act when there is a duty to act); Martini v. Russell, 582 F. Supp. 136, 141
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (same). Most inaction cases deal with the state's failure to train or supervise prison
and police officials. See, eg., Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1982) (failure to supervise
prison officials); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied sub nom. County
of Nassau v. Owens, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ga.
1983) (failure to supervise police officials), appeal dismissed, 724 F.2d 881 (1Ith Cir. 1984); Popow v.
City of Margate, 476 F. Supp. 1237 (D. N. J. 1979) (same). A recent decision suggests that courts
are willing to extend § 1983 liability to inaction outside the usual prison or police contexts. See Doe
v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), after remand, 709 F.2d 782
(2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 104 S. Ct. 195 (1983). In Doe, the
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1983.
No comprehensive rule exists, however, regarding the actionability of
simple negligence under section 1983. Early lower court decisions
reached opposite conclusions.3" In Parratt v. Taylor,31 the Supreme
Court partially resolved the confusion over the sufficiency of negligent
conduct in actions under section 1983.32 In Parratt, prison officials negli-
gently lost an inmate's hobby materials.33 The inmate brought suit under
section 1983, claiming that the officials deprived him of his property
without due process of law.34 Justice Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion,
held that a negligent deprivation of property could support a section
1983 claim. 35 The deprivation in Parratt occurred, however, not because
of an established state procedure, but rather as a result of a "random and
unauthorized act."36 Although procedural due process ordinarily con-
templates a predeprivation hearing,37 negligence, by definition, precludes
plaintiff claimed that the state agency's failure to properly monitor her foster care led to abuse by her
foster father. 649 F.2d at 137. The court held that the agency's inaction could amount to "deliber-
ate indifference," sufficient for liability under § 1983. 649 F.2d at 141.
30. For decisions finding negligence actionable, see, e.g., Carter v. Estelle, 519 F.2d 1136, 1136-
37 (5th Cir. 1975) (prison guards' negligence actionable); Fitzke v. Shappel, 468 F.2d 1072, 1077 n.7
(6th Cir. 1972) (negligent failure to provide medical assistance actionable).
For decisions finding negligence insufficient, see, e.g., Owen v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir.
1979) (simple negligence insufficient under § 1983), cert denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); Bonner v.
Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1976) (en bane), cerL denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978) ("mere
negligence" insufficient); Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 601 (1st Cir. 1974) (plaintiff must allege
malice or excessive neglect).
31. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
32. The Supreme Court has twice avoided the issue. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137
(1979); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). The Court decided both cases on alternative
grounds, never reaching the negligence issue; see also Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and
Closing the Door on Section 1983, 9 HAsTINGS CONSr. L.Q. 545, 568-69 (1982) (discussing Baker
and Procunier).
33. 451 U.S. at 529. The plaintiff ordered hobby materials worth $23.50, which were lost when
prison officials negligently failed to follow procedures for handling prisoners' mail. Id. at 530.
34. Id. The plaintiff sued the warden and the hobby manager of the prison.
35. 451 U.S. at 532-35. Like Justice Douglas in Monroe, see supra note 22 and accompanying
text, Justice Rehnquist refused to analogize § 1983 to 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1982), § 1983's criminal
counterpart, which requires "willful" conduct. 451 U.S. at 534-35. The defendant's state of mind,
he implied, is irrelevant. Justice Rehnquist contended that § 1983 requires only two elements:
(1) conduct committed "under color of" state law and (2) deprivation of a right, privilege or immu-
nity guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Id. at 535.
36. Id. at 541. Justice Rehnquist also stressed that while the plaintiff's loss is "attributable to
the State as action under 'color of law,'" these types of losses are almost always unpreventable by
the State. Id.
37. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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any predeprivation procedure. 38  In the Parratt situation, a postdepriva-
tion hearing may be constitutionally adequate.39 Justice Rehnquist con-
cluded that the availability of a state tort remedy satisfies due process.40
Parratt dealt with property interests,41 leaving undecided issues con-
cerning deprivations of other interests. Since Parratt, courts have incon-
sistently treated official negligence resulting in loss of life.42 For
38. 451 U.S. at 541. Because negligence is unpredictable, see supra note 37, "it is not only
impracticable, but impossible, to provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation." Id.
39. See, eg., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); North American Cold Storage
Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
40. 451 U.S. at 543-44. Justice Rehnquist relied heavily on a lower court decision "remarkably
similar" toParratt, Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), to conclude that an adequate
state remedy satisfies due process. 451 U.S. at 541-42. In Parratt, the state had a tort claim proce-
dure directly addressing the plaintiff's grievance. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 81-8,209 to 8,239.06
(1981).
Justice Rehnquist then considered the possibility that a state remedy might not be "adequate."
Although some state remedies might not compensate a victim as fully as § 1983, "that does not mean
that the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process." 451 U.S. at 543-
44. Thus, if the state provides a claim procedure addressing the right allegedly deprived by the
officials' negligence, then federal jurisdiction is foreclosed. This conclusion, however, is currently
under debate. See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
The concurring opinions offer diverse viewpoints on the plurality opinion. Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justice White, emphasized that the negligence holding applied only to deprivations of
property, not of life or liberty. Id. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He also objected to the ap-
proval of "postdeprivation remedies," expressing concern that courts might apply Parratt to inten-
tional conduct. Id. at 545-46.
Justice Marshall agreed that § 1983 reached negligent conduct and that the state tort remedy
satisfied due process considerations. Id at 554-55 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). He suggested, however, that state officials have an affirmative duty to inform their victims of
available state remedies. Failure to do so, he argued, permits a federal action under § 1983. Id. at
556.
Justice Stewart doubted that Congress intended § 1983 to embrace negligence but agreed that the
state procedure satisfied due process requirements. Id. at 544-45 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Finally, Justice Powell rejected negligence as actionable conduct under § 1983, suggesting a much
higher standard. He argued that a "deprivation" within the meaning of § 1983 and the fourteenth
amendment connotes "an intentional act. . . or, at the very least, a deliberate decision not to pre-
vent a loss." Id. at 546-54 (Powell, J., concurring). A higher standard, he argued, avoids "trivial-
izing" the remedy secured by § 1983, a remedy against abuses by state officials, not against "merely
negligent" actions. Id. at 549 & 554 n.13. See supra note 15. Justice Powell also disagreed with the
alternative state remedy approach. He feared that the unavailability of state remedies would make
the fourteenth amendment a "font of tort law." Id. at 550 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701
(1976)).
41. See text accompanying notes 33 & 34; see also supra note 40 (discussing Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion); see also infra note 87 (discussing recent developments in the actionability of
property deprivations under § 1983).
42. Compare Eberle v. Baumfalk, 524 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Ii. 1981) (dismissing § 1983 claim
for negligent deprivation of liberty interest on grounds that the state's postdeprivation hearing pro-
vided the victim with due process) with Howse v. DeBerry Correctional Inst., 537 F. Supp. 1177
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol63/iss2/4
Number 2] NEGLIGENT RESCUE
example, in Meshkov v. Abington Township,43 a decedent's father brought
a section 1983 action alleging negligent deprivation of his son's life.'
The court dismissed the case, noting that the father could pursue his
claim in the state courts.45 Conversely, in Morrison v. Washington
County,4 6 also an action for negligent deprivation of life,4 7 the court al-
lowed the plaintiff to sue under section 1983 despite the availability of a
state tort remedy.48
In Jackson v. City of Joliet,4 9 the Seventh Circuit faced a section 1983
claim based on simple negligence and failure to act.5° Judge Posner,
writing for a unanimous panel, first addressed the plaintiffs' claim that
the defendants failed to rescue the victims and prevented passersby from
doing so.5 Judge Posner replied that the defendants had no common-
law duty to rescue a stranger.5 2 He noted, though, that once the defend-
(M.D. Tenn. 1982) (arguing that Parratt's negligence standard applied only to deprivations of prop-
erty interests). See generally Friedman, supra note 32, at 572-78 (discussing the inconsistent hold-
ings following Parratt).
43. 517 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
44. Id. at 1283. The father alleged that police officers negligently allowed his son to hang
himself in jail and that the township and police chief negligently failed to supervise and train the
officers. Id.
45. Id. at 1286. The court in Meshkov also suggested that the Constitution was not meant to
protect against "carelessness." Id.
46. 521 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Ala.), rev'd, 700 F.2d 678 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 195
(1983).
47. Id. at 949-52. In Morrison, the victim died in jail after his allegedly negligent transfer from
a hospital.
48. 700 F.2d 678, 680, 686-87 (11th Cir. 1983), rev'g 521 F. Supp. 947 (S.D. Ala. 1981). The
Eleventh Circuit reversed a summary judgment for the defendants, an implicit acknowledgement
that the plaintiff could prosecute his claim under § 1983 notwithstanding the existence of an ade-
quate state remedy. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-410 (1975) (providing a cause of action for wrongful
death caused by negligence).
49. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1325 (1984).
50. Although the court's opinion and holding, as well as the complaint, use the words "gross
negligence" and "recklessly," 715 F.2d at 1202 & 1206, Judge Posner states the issue as "whether
the negligent failure" of state officers to act supports a claim under § 1983. Id. at 1201 (emphasis
added). References by the Jackson court to gross negligence are dicta.
51. Id. at 1202.
52. Id. See, e.g., Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959) (defendant's failure to
rescue the victim after urging and taunting him into the water is not actionable, absent a legal duty
to rescue). See generally Note, The Failure to Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L. REv.
631 (1952) (analyzing duty to rescue under various legal systems).
Judge Posner cites two cases for the proposition that policemen and firemen have no duty to
rescue. See Williams v. California, 34 Cal.3d 18, 192 Cal. Rptr. 233, 664 P.2d 137 (1983); Warren v.
District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 3-9 (D.C. App. 1981). But see Huey v. Barloga, 277 F. Supp. 864,
872 (N.D. Ill. 1967) ("City officials and police officers are under an affirmative duty to. . . protect
the personal safety of persons in the community."); Nastasio v. Cinnamon, 295 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.
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ants began a rescue, they assumed a duty to exercise due care not to
exacerbate the victims' predicament. 3 Judge Posner concluded that a
duty to exercise due care did arise,54 but doubted that the defendants'
inaction worsened the victims' situation. 5
Turning to the state-of-mind issue, Judge Posner reaffirmed the action-
ability of intentional conduct under section 1983.56 With respect to unin-
tentional deprivations, however, he reached a different result.5 7 Where
the state's negligence "did not create but merely failed to avert dan-
ger,"58 the action fell outside section 1983's reach. 9 Judge Posner noted
that the Constitution protects citizens from oppression but does not
1956) (a fireman has a duty to extinguish fires and protect property and life threatening therefrom)
(citation omitted).
53. 715 F.2d at 1202-03. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) (a person who
undertakes to rescue someone is subject to liability for negligence "if the harm is suffered because of
the other's reliance upon the undertaking" or for discontinuing the rescue and leaving the victim
worse off).
54. 715 F.2d at 1202-03. Judge Posner argues that some cases strain the notion that potential
rescuers will withhold their assistance when they see someone else rendering aid. He concludes,
however, that in Jackson no one was likely to assist the victims with policemen and firemen present,
especially when the policemen directed traffic away from the accident. Id. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (supporting the finding of a duty when a person undertakes a rescue
and discourages others from assisting).
55. 715 F.2d at 1205. Judge Posner retreated from his earlier position, see supra note 54, con-
cluding that "[it] is extremely unlikely that a passing motorist would enter a burning car on the off
chance that the occupants were still in it...." Id. at 1205.
56. Id. at 1202. "It would be a different case if intentional misconduct were alleged," Judge
Posner stated. Id. The lack of intentional conduct also allowed the court to dismiss the plaintiff's
equal protection claim. Id. at 1203. See supra note 27 (only deliberate discrimination violates equal
protection).
57. Id. at 1204-05. Judge Posner first examined cases in which state officials were found liable
for their unintentional inaction. See Wood v. worachek, 618 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1980) (jailers failed
to provide medical attention); White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (police arrested
driver, leaving children in a driverless car); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1974) (jailers
failed to protect prisoner from assault). Judge Posner distinguished these cases from Jackson, argu-
ing that when the courts did impose liability, the defendant's inaction created the initial danger to
the plaintiffs. 715 F.2d at 1204. Judge Posner overlooked a second and more important distinction,
The defendant's conduct in the cited cases resembled gross rather than simple negligence.
Judge Posner then analyzed cases in which state officials did not create danger but merely failed to
avert it. See Bowers v. Devito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (victim killed by a schizo-
phrenic released by the state); Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1982) (victims
killed after being hit by a train; plaintiff alleged that city failed to enforce its speed limit and main.
tain its crossing); Reif v. City of Philadelphia, 471 F. Supp. 1262 (E. D. Pa. 1979) (victim wounded
by robber before police arrived). None of these cases, Judge Posner asserted, presented a § 1983
claim. 715 F.2d at 1205.
58. Id. at 1204-05.
59. Id. at 1205.
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grant them basic services.' To hold the state liable for a botched rescue,
he reasoned, would compel the state to provide the basic service of
rescue.
61
The state's conduct in this case amounted to mere inaction rather than
"oppression." 62 Judge Posner suggested that proper redress lay in the
state courts.63 He feared that an expansive interpretation of section 1983
would intrude on the province of state tort law.64 In conclusion, Judge
Posner held that when a victim dies as a result of a failed rescue attempt,
no due process violation occurs if the rescuer's conduct does not exceed
gross negligence.
Although reaching the proper result, the court in Jackson employed
flawed and unnecessary reasoning. A fact-finder could have concluded
that the state officials in Jackson breached a duty not to exacerbate the
decedents' predicament. 66 Judge Posner hesitantly concedes the possibil-
ity.67 Because negligence is actionable under section 198368 and in light
of the possible breach of duty, the court's conclusion that the officers'
conduct fails to support a claim is wrong.69
60. Id. at 1203. The Constitution contains negative rather than positive liberties. Id. By nega-
uve liberties, Judge Posner means that the Constitution prohibits the federal and state governments
from interfering with certain fundamental liberties. According to Judge Posner, the drafters of the
fourteenth amendment were concerned with "the use of state-created power to kill rather than with
the state's failing to prevent death." Id. at 1204. Moreover, the difference between harming and
helping is precisely the difference between negative and positive liberties. Id.
61. Id. at 1203. The Supreme Court has refused to find a constitutionally mandated duty to
provide basic services on several occasions. See, eg., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (no "right" to education); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no "right" to
housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (no "right" to welfare assistance).
62. 715 F.2d at 1205. Arguably, inaction and oppression are mutually exclusive. See supra
note 32 (discussing actionable omission cases under § 1983). If Judge Posner is suggesting by his
insistence on oppressive conduct that the drafters intended mere simple negligence to trigger § 1983,
then he has some support. See, eg., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 546-49 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. 715 F.2d at 1205. If the state provides inadequate police and fire protection and if elected
state judges fail to provide adequate tort remedies, then "political retribution will come swift and
sure." Id.
64. Id. Judge Posner suggested that the imposition of liability in this case would permit any
accident victim to gain federal jurisdiction by arguing that a state official should have done more. Id.
at 1205-06. See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.) (same argument
presented against expanding scope of § 1983).
65. 715 F.2d at 1206.
66. See supra notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text.
67. 715 F.2d at 1202-03. See supra notes 57 & 58.
68. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
69. The court must treat all of the nonmoving party's allegations as true in deciding a motion to
dismiss. 2A J. MOORE & J. LucAs, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE 12.08 (1984). Thus, the plain-
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Judge Posner could have avoided the lengthy constitutional discussion
by extending Parratt° to the facts of Jackson.71 In both cases, the source
of the plaintiffs' injuries was negligent conduct rather than intentional
conduct or an established state procedure.72 Also like Parratt, the plain-
tiffs in Jackson had an available state remedy.73
In Jackson, however, the plaintiffs suffered deprivations of a liberty
interest rather than a property interest.74 Some courts limit Parratt's
application to property interests,75 embracing an implicit "hierarchy of
constitutionally protected interests. ' 76 Extension of Parratt to liberty in-
terests would not undermine this hierarchy. 7  When bare negligence is
the alleged misconduct, no logical reason compels treating liberty and
property interests differently.78 A "random and unauthorized act," re-
gardless of which interest it injures, is unpredictable and amenable only
to postdeprivation relief.79 Because state remedies provide due process in
most negligence cases,80 federal relief under section 1983 becomes unnec-
essary. When actions exceed negligent, and approach intentional, mis-
tiffs' allegations in Jackson that the officers' presence discouraged potential rescuers should support a
finding of duty to rescue.
70. See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text (discussing Parratt).
71. Judge Posner's constitutional arguments against a state's duty to rescue are particularly
inappropriate in the context of a motion to dismiss. See supra note 69.
72. In Jackson, however, the plaintiffs did challenge the directive issued by the coroner, argua-
bly an established state procedure. See supra note 7. This challenge, however, was only one of
several § 1983 claims.
73. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1983) ("Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by
wrongful act, neglect, or default, there is a cause of action for damages.").
74. Although the plaintiffs in Jackson alleged deprivations of life, Judge Posner's discussion
dealt with liberty. This anomaly occurs because most courts discuss due process interests only in
terms of property or liberty, with life falling under the liberty interest. See, e.g., Thurman v. Rose,
575 F. Supp. 1488, 1490 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
75. See Note, Parratt v. Taylor: Limitations on the Parratt Analysis in Section 1983 Actions, 59
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1388, 1403 n.1 11 (1984) (collecting cases); see also supra note 40 (concurring
opinion in Parratt by Justice Blackmun, suggesting that the decision applies only to deprivations of
property).
76. See Note, supra note 75, at 1404-05. The author submits that while no hierarchy is ex-
pressly mentioned anywhere, American jurisprudence has long recognized that property interests are
more yielding than liberty interests. Id. at 1404.
77. Id. at 1402 n.101 (collecting cases).
78. For example, consider a situation where a fireman negligently leaves some equipment on
the sidewalk, causing a pedestrian to slip and fall. It would be illogical to allow the pedestrian to sue
under § 1983 if he broke his arm (liberty interest) but not allow him to sue in federal court if he only
broke a cane that he was carrying (property interest). Yet, ifParratt were limited to deprivations of
property, this inconsistency would be commonplace.
79. See supra notes 36 & 38 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text.
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conduct, section 1983 will have greater application8 ' and the hierarchy of
interests will acquire more significance. 82
The Jackson decision is correct if read against Parratt's logic.8 3 This
reading would also reduce the amount of unnecessary civil rights cases in
the federal courts.84 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Jackson,
perhaps tacitly approving a restriction of section 1983.85 Still, negligence
actions under section 1983 are inconsistent.86 Until the Supreme Court
81. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
82. An important reflection of the Supreme Court's attitude towards the "hierarchy of constitu-
tionally protected interests" is Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984). In Hudson, a unanimous
Court extended Parratt's alternative state remedy holding, see supra note 40 and accompanying text,
to intentional deprivations of property to deny a prisoner a cause of action under § 1983. 104 S. Ct.
at 3202-04. The Court's willingness to relegate virtually all alleged deprivations of property to state
courts perhaps illustrates too well the distinction between property and liberty interests. Because
deprivations of property resulting from negligent to intentional conduct are now outside § 1983's
reach, assuming an adequate state remedy, liberty remains the only interest weighty enough to in-
yoke § 1983's protection.
83. Parratt offers a safeguard to the victim of a state official's negligence, suggesting that the
victim will have access to federal courts if there is no alternative state remedy. Though the Court
did not reach the question, the conclusion follows, a fortiori, from the Court's discussion about
alternative state remedies. Presumably, the Court would not have dismissed the prisoner's § 1983
claim if a state tort claim had not been available.
There are other reasons for extending Parratt's alternative remedy rationale to all negligent depri-
vations. Despite § 1983's neutral language and the Court's recognition that negligence can trigger
§ 1983, negligence does not do as much violence to the Constitution as intentional or grossly negli-
gent conduct, Cf Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw.
U.L. REv. 277, 327 (1960) (suggesting that "the defendant's conduct must be outrageous" to trigger
§ 1983 (emphasis in original)).
Finally, an unchecked application of § 1983 to negligence cases could swallow up state tort law.
See supra note 74; see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979) (remedy for violation of duty
of due care must be sought in state courts, not under § 1983); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701
(1976) (expanding § 1983 to cover all injuries by state officials would make the fourteenth amend-
ment a "font of tort law").
84. Civil rights cases, including prisoner petitions, accounted for 20.9% of all civil litigation in
federal courts for the year ending June 30, 1983. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OF-
FICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 122-23 (4th ed. 1983).
85. 104 S. Ct. 1325 (1984). Lately members of the Court have expressed strong dissatisfaction
with the increasing volume of civil rights cases. See supra note 26 (restricting § 1983 in Hudson v.
Palmer); see also Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1988-89 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting). In
Pulliam, Justice Powell suggests that the "lure of substantial fee awards," given to prevailing civil
rights plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, assures that suits against state officials will increase geomet-
rically. 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1988-89 & nn. 16-18.
86. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text; see also Jackson v. City of Joliet, 104 S. Ct.
1325, 1325-26 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice White, joined by Jus-
tice Rehnquist, argued that the inconsistency among the lower courts since Parratt is attributable, in
part, to the Court's failure to provide guidelines for recognizing a constitutional tort. The Jackson
case, he concluded, provides an opportunity to resolve this issue. 104 S. Ct. at 1325-26.
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provides clearer guidance, lower courts addressing negligent deprivations
of liberty should extend Parratt87 and thereby create a uniform, rational
approach to a confused area of civil rights litigation.
C.A.B.
87. The day after the court decided Jackson, the Fourth Circuit reached a similar result, ex-
pressly extending Parratt to negligent deprivation of liberty and dismissing the § 1983 claim in light
of an available state remedy. See Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792, 796 (4th Cir. 1983).
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